

8.6.3

for isibpa

42216

Section Seven

Nr. der Aufgabe  
der Verschlußbedienung  
und in dem vorher  
Geschoss am:  
**14 DEC 1945** 10x  
und Name in Pfeil  
mit entsprechender

**Sofort zustellen!**

*Frankreich*

**Eigenhändig! Geheim!**

Absender:

**Sonderdienst Seehaus**

des Auswärtigen Amtes und des  
Reichsministeriums für Volksaufklärung  
und Propaganda

Berlin SW 11, Schließfach 74  
Fernruf: 80 62 12 und 80 62 13

An

Repr.  
Botsch. Ritter  
Berlin  
Wilhelmstraße 71, Zimmer 106a

043

Geschlossen am:  
194

Nach dem Auftleben  
des Verschlußstreifens  
sind an dazu vorge-  
sicherter Stelle Datum  
und Name mit Tinte  
stift anzufüllen.

(Name)

S C E N E

P F A M  
-----  
(Brussels)

Exhibit One

GERMAN INTERNATIONAL BANKING AND TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

November 1943. Moyningen-Meuna, German Minister to Portugal regarding wolfram negotiations; 600 tons of wolfram under negotiation with Salazar, to be based similarly on terms of preceding agreement.

B.S. 50

UK Corporation stalled deliveries; wolfram obtainable, but funds lacking in Embassy; prospects poor for receipt of further deliveries;

Hans Dieckhoff, German Ambassador to Spain, asked for reduction of duty on wolfram; Councillor denied request pointing to American suggestion that full embargo be placed on wolfram.

11 December 1943. Becker, German Counselor in Madrid, stated Sofimex had claimed export of Wolfram concentrate to Germany Jan.-Sept. 30, 1943 equalled 648 tons plus 100 tons black (market) normal export from Ortuapee. 11, 1943 equalled 200 tons.

17 February 1944. England offered arms deliveries to SPAIN IN EXCHANGE for embargoes on tungsten to Germany.

B.S. 129

25 February 1944. Proposal to export 200 tons not accepted. Bernhardt of Sofimex intended to export tungsten disguised as lead.

25 February 1944. Sofimex received export permit for lead; tungsten to be substituted; 600 tons currently in Iran.

Count Jordana, Spanish Foreign Minister, desired restriction of tungsten to all countries, 500-700 tons to be Germany's share. Moreno, Minister of Navy, Jordana's sole supporter in Cabinet Franco basically in agreement. Councillor, Minister of Industry and Commerce, would be great loss to Germany in a cabinet shakeup.

6 March 1944. Ammunition, gasoline, grain, ammonium phosphate, phosphates, rubber and cotton from Germany were under discussion.

- 2 -

B.S. 65

December 1943. German attempts to seize Italian  
Funds; believed Spanish payment of civil war claims  
in treasury certificates still available to Fascist  
Republicans; Malm instructed to dispatch Italian gold  
at Milan to Pransensfeste.

- 3 -

Undated. No reason to believe tungsten exports from Portugal would increase except for increased production in German-owned mines.

B.S. 148

January 1944. Vigón, Spanish Minister for Air supports delivery of 150 tons wolfram; lead also.

B.S. 148

February 1944. Ribbentrop suggests uncompromising attitude toward Spanish wolfram agreements

March 1944. Britain and United States attempting to limit to 10 per cent, Spanish wolfram for Germany with balances to Allies.

Jordana's feasible points on wolfram export:

1. Spain's sovereignty and neutrality threatened
2. Government not responsible for delivery delays
3. Wolfram exports in 1943 was 847.7 tons consisting of normal 732.7 tons plus 142 tons covered by aviation agreement. 1,525 tons were ready for export in 1943.
4. German arguments to be based on supplies to Spanish economy.
5. Jordana had not answered Dieckhoff's demand of 26 February 1944 for export of 300 tons.

March 1944. Dieckhoff and Co. Pemaranda negotiate to exchange scrap iron for wolfram. Disguised negotiations might have Jordana's consent. Pemaranda advised not to mention suggested exchange of 1,000 cars and 40 locomotives for wolfram or they might demand that this matter be handled through clearing—but might be mentioned in a political deal involving grain or oil. Pemaranda stated risks in smuggling wolfram were increased by essentially independent exports of raw rubber and molybdenum. Discussion of conflicting reports on wolfram production during 1943-1944 indicated that Germany was obtaining 15 per cent of total.

B.S. 234

February 1944. Regarding tungsten negotiations between Germany and Portugal, Inter reported with demand of 50,000 rather than 40,000 tons of iron. Germany will buy 150 tons from Germany. Germany desires most products. Settlement of proposed agreement contingent on delivery of 150 tons of wolfram.

- 4 -

German Minister believed Portuguese would  
halt wolfram production rather than break  
with British. January 1944 production,  
79 tons

B.S. 244  
can't

German Minister instructed to press Salazar  
to force manufacturers to cease hoarding  
and thus deterring government contracts.

19 January 1944. The camouflaged shipments of zinc  
to be included in coffee shipment.

B.S. 241

April 1944. 14,718 tons of chrome from Turkey to  
Germany.

B.S. 258

March 1944. Amatrat Gudehr accompanied shipment  
of 6,000,000 gold marks to Spain.

B.S. 264

May 1944. Sefindus German-controlled Spanish  
firm exporting wolfram illegally in excess of  
quota; since early April 1944, 300 tons had been  
shipped directly from mines; Sefindus thought  
hoping to export four times officially allowed  
quota. Approximately 400 tons purchased but  
unexported; Dieckhoff, German Ambassador,  
stated that there would be an exchange of 40,000  
tons of grain for 6,000 tons of oil.

B.S. 277

Indicates control of wolfram smuggling officially  
shifted to Spanish April through 5 June 1944 Se-  
findus smuggled 381 tons concentrate. 9 June 1944  
Sefindus purchased 300 tons; 250 tons will be  
forthcoming at cost of 120,000 pesetas per tons.

B.S. 329

Sefindus suggested 600,000 mark fund controlled  
by Hahle and Bernhardt to guarantee both German  
and Spanish nationalism.

July 1944. Col. Vales, Argentina Military Attaché,  
negotiating through Madrid representative of Bruen  
and Gieseke for arms and manufacturing rights to be  
paid in fine foreign exchange.

B.S. 336

Indicates Weber, President of Swiss National  
Bank, regarding agreement with Puhl, Vice Presi-  
dent of Deutsche Reichsbank, permitting Reichs-  
bank to sell gold for Swiss francs according to  
a monthly quota, thus enabling Germany to con-  
tinues exchanging Swiss francs for foreign

B.S. 355

- 5 -

exchange of other countries, and thus provide for continuance of foreign commitments of all sorts.

B.S. 355  
con't

June-July 1944. Sefindus wolfram smuggling; new scheme involving payments to Minerales de Espana by method involving use of several banks and power of attorney for Minerales de Espana from Gesellschaft für Elektrometallurgie in Berlin to sell wolfram in Spain and pay proceeds to German Embassy.

B.S. 373

July 1944. Dr. Wellhardt, Oberstabs Engineer, regarding promise of Spanish Air Minister to pool equipment needed by Germany with Spanish orders to be sent to Switzerland; contracts in Switzerland to be made through such Spanish companies as Allgemeine Elektricitäts Gesellschaft or Telefunkon Espanolas

B.S. 374

July 1944. Casoller, Spanish Minister of Industry and Commerce, Merila (?), an expert on the commission for special ores, and Finance Minister Benjumea, involved to some extent in the "Wolfram Sender Aktien", a Spanish group engaged in smuggling wolfram to Germany.

B.S. 402

August 1944. Jorge d'Almada Araujo, connected with "Mundo Mundial"; engaged in wolfram smuggling from Portugal to Spain, destined for Germany

B.S. 447

August 1944. Portuguese wolfram negotiations. Planned shipment of ore for Germany which arrived in Oeiras. Shipment to Sefindus could not be made.

B.S. 447a

November 1944. German-Portuguese transactions in Swiss francs--Bank of Portugal would prefer sale of Swiss francs through normal bank transactions; by passing through a Swiss bank the Bank of Portugal could sell to any Portuguese bank one million escudos worth of Swiss francs each month; no objection to transactions through such banks as Banco Lissabon in the Azores

B.S. 763

- 6 -

November 1944. Discussion by German Embassy  
Commodore Elbra of transfer to Embassy through  
Sefindus (Sociedad Financiera e Industrial) for  
setting up currency exchange. B.S. 566

October 1944. Negotiations between Santos Costa,  
Portuguese Minister of War and Baron von Knigge,  
thought to be economic adviser to the German  
Legation in Lisbon, for delivery of arms to  
Germany; shipment to be via Switzerland;  
Hermann-Borsig Aktiengesellschaft, (main  
office in Dusseldorf) participating. B.S. 567

November 1944. Shipments of partial arms orders  
from Spain to Germany by plane embarrassing to  
Spaniards due to Allied pressure; Russian, British  
and American papers attacking Franco's regime with  
further attacks anticipated. B.S. 568

October 1944. Becker, Madrid, stated Reich Ministry  
of Finance instructed Sefindus to check with Madrid  
Embassy regarding 12,000 ton wolfram concentrate to  
be harbored at Embassy under diplomatic immunity  
claims. Elbra objected as presumption to (1) Embassy  
property which might be endangered by such procedure  
and (2) no grounds or lack of space. B.S. 570

Case complicated by Spanish production tax of  
100,000,000 pesetas due at time of export but  
claimable by Spanish Treasury independent of ship-  
ment and of country. B.S. 571

October 1944. Moll, Riesau (Stuttgart branch of  
THOMM) Deisinger allegedly arranging air transport  
of wolfram to Germany. Garcia from Salamanca, re-  
ported discussions with Deisinger. B.S. 572

September 1944. Deisinger returned to Spain ap-  
parently not on wolfram matters; Germans con-  
cerned over attention he attracted.

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p. 8.B. 611.

December 1944. Edgar Horn, member Board of West-Germany Winters-Industrie AG, in Darmstadt, northwest Germany - visited Spain December 1944, on assessment mission for machine tools for Jaeger program to be shipped to Sweden on Spanish ship.

December 1944. Johannes Bernhard, president of Sofindus, Bells 612 ~~Waffen~~ (well-known Spanish firm, and Oberfuehrer of SS in Spain) re financial transaction for cost of supplying German-held Atlantic fortress at Bayan.

December 1944. Dealer, unidentified. Bells 613

December 1944. Lohse, of Sofindus - smuggling ~~Waffen~~ <sup>100</sup> supply of Atlantic fortress, Bayan. Bells 613

- 8 -

December 1944. Edgar Horn, commissioned to acquire calcium for military stations and armaments (see Ref. 611); dealing with metal works of Lipperheide y Guzman in Bilbao; Lipperheide is German partner of the firm.

B.S. 784

December 1944. Saes Casariego, looked after Spanish interests of German potash syndicate; good connections in Spanish Government circles. Lequerizo advised him to disguise German funds so that they would not be affected by Allied pressure for action against German funds in Spain.

B.S. 787

December 1944. Gerechter denied rumors that payment for transfer from American to Spanish hands of controlling interest in Compania Telefonica Nacional de Espana would be made in part through transfer to American control of Spanish potash producing company, Union Espanola de Explosivos.

B.S. 788

December 1944. Puhl, Vice President of Reichsbank; held conferences with Swiss bankers and businessmen who unanimously declared they would rather not forgo advantages of free exchange until end of hostilities or longer; negotiations with Weber, President of Swiss National Bank, conducted in "usual atmosphere of trust"; National Bank would contract for considerable amounts of Reichsbank gold deposited in Berne; gold reserves in Berne to be replenished with National Bank taking personal charge of transfer of gold across the border; Metz and Bonberger of Swiss Economic Delegation wanted to make consent dependent on firm German promise to deliver real; in discussion of shrinkage of German export funds for large German purchases in Switzerland and even so-called incidents, including maintenance of German official representatives, Weber stated "legitimate German needs" would be met.

B.S. 802

Brencher, Chief Administrative Officer of OEW, stated with regard to Four Year Plan that OEW recommended transactions through private banking institutions acting as intermediaries; OEW would permit French franc notes remaining from occupation, which French authorities had been trying to dump in Switzerland and Portugal, to be utilized at a certain rate of exchange (Lisbon quoted \$0

B.S. 803

- 9 -

escudos for 1,000 franc notes); recommended Reich Minister of Economics make transport planes available for transfer of French notes to Lisbon; losses of exchange to be charged against Wehrmacht account. December 1944.

B.S. 805  
can't

January 1945. Swiss-German rocket negotiations, involving demonstration of rocket projector by Kolin-Bottweil Company, German Government concern manufacturing powder and signal flares, for ETA (Swiss War Technology Section; conversations between Kolin-Bottweil representative and Brindlinger and Bührle, Swiss industrialists; discussion between Bührle and Steinle of Reichssicherheitsheimat in Genfensee; discussion between Brindlinger and Brigadier Colonel von Wattenwyl, Chief of ETA; further negotiations to be conducted by Kolin-Bottweil; ETA instigated application for Swiss visas for Directors Geisler and Decker of Kolin-Bottweil.

B.S. 804

September 1945. Switzerland refuses to increase deliveries of roller bearings and radio apparatus. Germany hopes for successful conclusion of her negotiations with the Orlon Mührle Co., Zurich, tool and munitions manufacturers, and with the Technoabteilung A.G., Zurich, machine factory.

B.S. 988

September 1945. German-Spanish negotiations between Mockenstury and Garelli, Spanish Minister of Economy, regarding German grain shipments to Spain in exchange for Spanish goods.

B.S. 1006

November 1945. German-Spanish wolfram negotiations.

B.S. 1007

December 1945. Hoffmuth reported export of 840 tons wolfram concentrate from 1 January to 30 September with additional 100 tons shipped illegally. Normal exports from October to December 11, 200 tons.

B.S. 1008

July 1946. Rodriguez, Basco y Martin, German-owned customs brokers and shipping firm in Madrid, handled illegal shipment of liver concentrate from Argentina to Germany via Spain.

B.S. 1009

- 10 -

Probably February 1848. Beginning sulphur smuggling; President proposed found idea of securing sulphur by using British Government-owned ore stocks impracticable since stocks were under strict Spanish control and any attempt to draw on them would render acute the threat to all Government stocks due to British pressures. Blackburn proposed that ore be purchased primarily in British market from owners not under suspicion and transported to appropriate coastal points under careful camouflage.

J. S. 251

Switzerland. German-Swiss clearing transactions, involving rate of exchange and supply of electricity in return for delivery of coal; Germans to pay monthly for Swiss share of current in cash or equivalent exchange and deliveries of Swiss current to be met by delivery of minimum amount of coal to Switzerland; Germans attempting to achieve more favorable terms with respect to exchange burden and price of electricity to coal; Swiss attitude stiffer than before; Ebeling, German Minister, recommended even non-binding agreement in preference to no agreement.

Page 82

1945. Such mechanism clearing agreement; would be sufficient to offset short term and surpluses by contract; in new market, central bank and spot exchange would be used without reverable balance of trade be settled through open market outlet if no mechanism provided; and to some certain stocks of foreign exchange would be available to cancellation.

M.L. 882

... negotiations  
with Mr. Ainsworth and Brigadier Gen. Vass  
and the other members of the Inter-Departmental  
Committee on Civil Defense. It is my opinion  
that the proposed legislation would be one  
of the best pieces of legislation ever introduced  
in this country. It would give the Federal  
Government power to require partial pay-  
ments from all persons who would  
be required to contribute to the defense  
fund.

B-88-883

- 11 -

February 1945. Swiss-German clearing negotiations;  
German deliveries of coal necessary to safeguard  
financial negotiations and keep Gotthard route  
open.

B.S. 044

February 1945. Swiss-German clearing negotiations;  
Swiss ultimatum that advance delivery of 10,000  
tons of coal necessary condition; Ambassador  
Schmurr told Foreign Minister Switzerland intended  
to make agreement despite arrival of Anglo-American  
Commission.

B.S. 045

February 1945. Swiss-German clearing negotiations;  
referred more difficult by German measures banning  
transit of Swedish goods through Germany to Switzer-  
land; Germany had very little to offer as it was.

B.S. 046

- 12 -

B.S. 912

January 1945. Transfer of SCHARNHORST to Japan; transfer certificate reported signed January 1945 but dated transferred as of 22 July 1943; in return Japan was to deliver four freighters of same age and in same condition as SCHARNHORST at time of transfer; delivery to be within two months after end of war of both countries with the common enemy; if these ships not available at that time, similar ones to be leased free of charge until specified ships could be transferred.

B.S. 975

March 1945. Dornier negotiations with Spanish Government involving German Counselor of Embassy Boehm, German Air Attaché Kraemer and Director Mayr of Dornier; 20 million pesetas outstanding for license of Dornier 24 Flying Boat, which Dornier could no longer license; negotiations under way for development of new model jointly by Dornier and Spanish Ministry of Aviation through which Germany could considerably increase her foreign credits since Dornier could supply Spaniards with blueprints of greatly improved technical developments.

B.S. 980

February 1945. Negotiations involving German funds in Croatia proposed use of Reichsmark pool in Croatia to redeem large sums presented by Croatian refugees to Germany; in this way Germany hoped to transfer surplus capital of German firms to the Reich.

B.S. 985

February 1945. German-Slovakian economic discussions on German Economic Delegation, German Commercial Attaché and Premier Vice; involved financing of Wehrmacht, evacuation of Slovakian Bank, financing of Slovakian legations and disposal of Reichsmark funds within the Reich.

- 13 -

December 1943. Illegal Portuguese tin shipments to be included in food shipments; Government agent lesser in charge of routing merchandise by train between Portugal and Germany.

B.S. 1010

February 1944. Allied sanctions to be balanced by German delivery of gasoline 3,000 to 5,000 tons to Spain, the negotiations for the delivery of grain having had such an excellent effect.

B.S. 1013

September 1943. Dieckhoff suggested protest by Neutral Government against payment to Badoglio Government of 50,000,000 peseta-debt due Italy for Spanish war debt. Bernhardt and Rahn discussions on 10 January 1943 to follow Bernhardt's opinion that Italian claim should be referred to Germany.

B.S. 1015

March 1944. German-Spanish negotiations to liquidate war claims to involve clearing advance of 300,000,000 pesetas to be balanced against Spanish war debt.

B.S. 1016

October 1943. Bayning-Suarez negotiations with Portuguese for special economic privilege, plus a new wolfram agreement.

B.S. 1036

November 1943. Swedish offer represented a sum of 200-240 million Reichsmarks resulting in a German deficit of 35 to 45 million due to disparity in German export volume.

B.S. 1089

- 14 -

B.S. 1149

February 1944. Maibacher regarding Greek financial situation. January 1944: Mismanagement of funds in attempt to stabilize Greek currency; occupation assets, withdrawal of direct assistance from International funds, and financial debacle involving Greeks and lack of goods force Greek currency failure; Economic and social consequences connected with collapse would prove serious to German Military interests.

B.S. 1178

September 1945. Negotiations regarding Turkish-German chrome deal involving 185,000 tons of ore discussed by Papen and Foreign Minister Menemencioglu through the Rti Bank (Turk) and Krupp. Difficulties of transport pending.

B.S. 1199

November 1945. Involving British efforts to prevent smuggling of small items of large strategic worth from South America to Spain and Portugal.

CLASSIFIED  
Form of DispatchOFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
OFFICIAL DISPATCH

DATE 26 MARCH 1945

FROM

NANKI, CHUNGKING

TO

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

DISTRIBUTION

PRIORITY  
ROUTINE  
DEFERRED

IN 8287

FOR ACTION

(FOR INFORMATION)

DIRECTOR, SECRETARIAT, MAGRUDER,  
X-2

SI

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16-2700-2

RECEIVED IN CODE OR CIPHER SECRET

SECRET

#1377. BOSTON. BIRD TO 109 AND CARIB. IN REFERENCE TO YOUR  
#4217 (OUT 6942) ON BOSTON SERIES.G-2 BELIEVES THEATER NEEDS WILL BE SERVED IF ALL TECHNICAL  
INTELLIGENCE CONTAINED IN BOSTON ARE SENT FAST POUCH. THEY  
WISH CONTINUATION OF INFORMATION OTHER THAN TECHNICAL BY RADIO.

→ RT

McBaines  
 28 March  
 various giving suggested 10  
 reply information so  
 soon for drawing up  
 another substance  
 approved by W.J.D.  
*to appear  
 this should  
 be called  
 8/26/45  
 RT*

INDICATOR INSERTED BY WASHINGTON MESSAGE CENTER.

TIME 0829 26 MAR 45

FILE COPY

SECRET

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WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION FROM THE SECRETARIAT

1/29/45

1/29/45

✓  
1/29/45  
1/29/45

29 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR General ~~Magruder~~ **SECRET**

SUBJECT: Boston Series

Confirming our conversation, I discussed with Lt. Putzell his memorandum of 26 January 1945 addressed to you. He stated that he had mentioned the budget to me in our previous conversation concerning the need for copies of KIS disseminations of Boston Series material, but that it was merely a casual reference. This was not the way his remarks impressed me and I have so expressed this to him. He indicated that he had no intention of using this material for such purpose, but merely wanted a copy for General Donovan's files.

Since this material was secured for General Donovan's records, a copy of it is being sent directly to Lt. Putzell.

**NOTE TO THE SECRETARY**

Thomas W. Dunn  
Lieut. (J.G.) USNR

TW/et

cc: Lt. Putzell ✓

**SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**15,336  
Action taken

General Magruder

26 January 1945

Lt. Putzell

Boston Series

X-2 TS 517 To Magruder 1/26

In writing the attached memorandum to you (dated 16 January 1945) for Colonel Pfaff's signature, Lt. Dunn stated an inaccuracy at the bottom of page 2.

I wish to point out that at no time in my conversation with him have I put the reason for the request upon the basis that the material is needed for budget purposes. I am well aware of the security problem inherent in the handling of this material.

E. J. Putzell, Jr.  
Lt. (j.g.) USN  
Assistant Executive  
Officer

**TOP SECRET**

OSS Form No. 4006

TOP SECRET

13536-2  
J. T. S.

3-36 C

SIGNATURE RECORD SHEET  
To be prepared by each TSCO upon receipt of a TOP SECRET document.

Description Source: Dr. V. L. Dunn. Addressed to: Gen. Headquarters Document date: 1-16-45 Document May-2, 29 Copy No: No. of pages: 3 Attachment: 29-TS	Registry Accession No: X-475517 Accession date: 1-18-45 Office or Branch: Y-2 Logged by: Hornblatt
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The attached document was received from the \_\_\_\_\_, Courier Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_  
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		NAME	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	INITIALS	DATE
1. TSCO							
2.	LEROY DUNN	1/25/45	12	4600	1/25/45	130	
3.	B. P. BURGESS	1/25/45	130	2800	1/26/45	300	
4.							
5.							
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11. TSCO							

In case no officials concerned have read this document, the TSCO must sign on line 11, detach this sheet from the document and retain it as a permanent record in his files. He must then deliver the document by Officer Courier to the next TSCO listed on this Distribution Routing Sheet attached to this document.

The attached document was released to the \_\_\_\_\_, Courier Receipt No. \_\_\_\_\_  
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1984-10-10

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100% LANA SHEET

To be prepared by the first NSCO who receives a TEC-SECRET message.

REF ID: A6424		8-45-1
NAME: MR. THOMAS W. DAVIS WITNESS: H. G. FOWLER		ACCESSION NO.: RG-146-87
ARMED FORCES ATTACHED DATE:	1-16-45	ACCESSION DATE: 1-18-45
ATTACHMENT NO.:	1-16-45	FILED IN: 38 JUN 1945
NO. OF PAGES:	ATTACHMENT NO. 29-185	INDEXED BY: J. M. COOK, T. E. BUCHANAN

SFTMNTFCM -

The attached TOP SECRET document is hereby transferred onto the temporary control of the TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER listed below who is charged with full responsibility for this document until receipt is obtained from another TRCOM. According to GS-1 TOP SECRET REGULATIONS, the first TRCOM to receive a GS-1 TOP SECRET document is entitled to use the TOP SECRET ACCESSION SHEET, USA Form 408-1, as prepared at page four Bounding Sheet. This form must remain attached to the document at all times to serve as a record of its movement between offices or branches within DCS. Each TRCOM who receives or releases this document will sign below and date the date and name. It must be transmitted between TRCOMs only by CEC or carrier. Registered Computer Recipients will be used.

These agents, because they contain oxygen, should be oxygenated air and  
oxygen tanks.

## T/SP RECP

334  
Boston Series

**TOP SECRET**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

16 January 1945

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER

SUBJECT: Boston Series

Early in September, following discussions with Col. Buxton and Mr. Cheston, concerning special disseminations of the Boston Series No. 384, No. 386 and No. 388, you will remember a general request was made of MIS for copies of all disseminations made by MIS in their special reports from the Boston Series. Since MIS, in disseminating the Boston Series thru the medium of their special reports, makes references to the Boston Series by name and states their source, it was felt that we should have copies of this material in our files.

The MIS representatives indicated that they would comply with this request but, because the job meant searching through a great number of files, and apparently in some instances duplicating copies, asked if there was any rush about supplying us with the material in question. Since, as we understood it, the request was simply one to complete OSS files, we stated that we would like to have the material at their convenience.

On two or three occasions, Lt. Putzell called X-2 to ask where these copies were and on each occasion, as well as on several others, the MIS representative was reminded of our continuing interest.

On 1 January 1945 X-2 received a Memorandum from MIS, dated 28 December 1944, which evaluated the Boston Series as a whole.

It, however, did not include any of the references or quotations from the actual MIS disseminations. When we pointed out again that we were interested in receiving actual copies of the disseminations, we were informed that the special report in which this material goes out not only is of a Top Secret nature but is limited in its dissemination to a very small group (i.e., Marshall, King, etc.); and that, since most of the material from the Boston Series had been so incorporated with the source which serves as the body for these special reports, it was impossible, in fact, to separate them. Naturally, Lt. Dunn asked to see these reports. He affirms

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL WAGRUDER -2-

18 January 1945

that this is quite true and that, while OSS has received credit in each instance, the Boston material has been worked in as either corroborating or adding additional facts to a picture.

However, the MIS representatives were asked if there were any instances in which they had used Boston Series material in toto and, if in those cases they would release copies of such material to us, since there would be no security question involved. They indicated that, in most instances, we had been immediately provided with copies of material so used but that they would check their files further to see if there were any reports so used which had not been given to OSS.

For this reason, we have been holding the Memorandum received on the first of January 1945 in order to obtain these disseminations. Two such disseminations were received today and are attached.

In order that you may have a complete file, you will find attached also a copy of all the evaluations of the Boston Series received from MIS under their various dates. Listed below are the dates on which this material was received:

10 January 1944  
7 March 1944  
6 April 1944  
1 June 1944

Evaluation of first report given to MIS  
Boston Series No. 1 through 76  
Boston Series No. 76 through 134  
Boston Series No. 134 through No. 164,  
plus evaluations of material not previously evaluated and certain special reports

22 August 1944  
5 September 1944  
7 September 1944

Dissemination of Boston Series in toto  
Dissemination of Boston Series in toto  
Boston Series No. 164 through 414, plus evaluations of certain back messages  
not previously covered  
Boston Series No. 418 through 419

16 October 1944  
27 October 1944  
28 December 1944

Dissemination of Boston Series in toto  
Overall evaluation of all material to date

OSS has a Top Secret document, dated 8 May 1944, entitled, "The Boston Series", one copy of which is in the Director's files, under the date 19 July 1944. This document, sent to the MIS "Top Listing" (see Attachment A), carefully explained the whole background of the Boston Series and disseminated certain Far East material.

Last night in a telephone conversation with Lt. Dunn, Lt. Putzell indicated that a new urgency exists for these special MIS disseminations, namely, for OSS budget purposes. The use of these special MIS disseminations for budget purposes, of course, raises several security problems which you, no doubt, will want to discuss with the


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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MAGRUDER -3-

16 January 1945

Secretariat. Therefore, instead of forwarding this material directly to the Secretariat, we are directing it to your attention.

  
Roger A. Pfeff  
Lt. Col. Inf.  
Acting Chief, X-2 Branch

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ATTACHMENT A.

"Top List"

Secretary of War -- Stimson  
Asst. Secretary of War --- McCloy  
Chief of Staff -- General Marshall  
CS AAF -- General Arnold  
Deputy C. of S. -- General McCaughan  
A.C. of S, G-2 -- General Bissell  
A.C. of S., OPD -- General Handy  
Deputy A.C. of S., G-2 -- Gen. Weckling  
A.C. of S. Intelligence -- White  
Comininch -- Admiral King  
Chief of O.N.I. -- Admiral Sherman Th. <sup>18</sup> vault

**TOP SECRET**

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Y~~SECRET~~WAR DEPARTMENT  
Military Intelligence Service  
Washington

10 Jan 44.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. THOMAS DUNN:

Subject: Parsley Case

Reference your memorandum of 7 Jan 44.

1. In the evaluation of information such as your report, for the purpose of determining the authenticity of the source, the following questions arise:

a. Is the report probably true?

b. Is the report of the kind that the source would be likely to issue?

c. Does the report contain information that it would be difficult to obtain from other sources?

d. Is the report of a kind that might be issued

(1) As a piece of deception from the source or a related source; or

(2) As a piece of merchandise by a fraudulent informer?

These questions as applied to your report are discussed below.

a. Is the report probably true?

2. The following is almost certainly true:

That the German naval authorities have recently asked the Foreign Office to talk with the Japanese on the subject of Timor, with a view to bringing about some concessions to Portugal.

This is not definitely known; but there is good reason to believe that one or more OKM representatives talked with one or more Japanese Naval Attachés in Europe during the first half of December 1943, on the subject of Timor; and that sort of approach would very likely be accompanied by an approach through diplomatic channels.

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3. The following seems doubtful:

That the OKM asked the Foreign Office to suggest evacuation of Timor.

The reasons for this doubt are:

a. The German Foreign Office is fully familiar with the controversy and discussions between the Portuguese and the Japanese concerning Timor; and it is presumed that the OKM is also familiar with the subject.

b. No one familiar with this subject would expect a suggestion for evacuation to be entertained for a moment.

c. The Japanese would consider such a suggestion so preposterous that their reaction to it might produce the opposite effect to that intended.

d. The Germans know this; they treat their Oriental friends with kid gloves, and do not make suggestions of this kind.

4. However, the Foreign Office might well tell the Japanese that the OKM had asked them to suggest evacuation. It would, in fact, be not untypical of Foreign Office methods for it to say, in making representations on the subject, that it had been asked by the OKM to request evacuation, and then to add that of course evacuation would be impossible but that it would be nice if the Japanese would restore communications between Timor and Lisbon and allow a Portuguese representative to visit the island and report about the goings-on there. These are the 2 matters with which the Portuguese Government has been worrying the Japanese for some time.

5. The writer doubts that the OKM asked the Foreign Office to suggest to the Japanese that they evacuate Timor, but considers it possible that the Foreign Office may have said so; and in any event the writer is satisfied that the OKM did take up this matter with the Foreign Office during the first half of December 1943.

b. Is the report of the kind that the source would be likely to issue?

6. This is a difficult question, in the absence of knowledge as to the person to whom the report was addressed. The best that I can say is that, whether the OKM suggested evacuation or suggested something less, I have trouble in imagining circumstances which would prompt the Foreign Office to send such a report to any of the persons to whom information on the particular subject would normally go. The story is a very old one to the most likely candidate, the German Minister in Lisbon. Also the statement of the Navy's reasoning seems rather an elucidation of the obvious, since nobody would need to tell Hoyningen-Huene, or any other German diplomat either, that Allied air bases in

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Portugal and the Cape Verde Islands would hamper the German submarine warfare, or that the subject was worrying the OKM.

7. In order to comment more accurately, without spending a lot of time thinking up straw men and then knocking them down, I would have to know the addressee.

8. On the information that I have, I am not satisfied that the report is of the kind that the presumed source would send out. However, there is always the possibility that the paraphrase is inaccurate. Moreover, I have frequently read paraphrases which were not inaccurate but which sounded implausible, but on reference to the original have found a document that was thoroughly plausible when read as a whole and with knowledge of the sender, addressee and evidence in the message as to its *raison d'être*.

c. Does the report contain information that it would be difficult to obtain from other sources?

9. That the Germans have been worried about the Timor situation for some months is probably a widely known fact; and the reasons for their concern are plain enough. That the OKM has been giving attention to the problem during the last couple of months is inferred by the writer from facts that are probably known to a good many people in European capitals. It is believed, therefore, that the message contains no information that it would be difficult to obtain from other sources or to infer or guess at from information that probably has circulated fairly widely.

d. (1) Is the report of a kind that might be issued as a piece of deception from the source or a related source?

10. The report has some of the earmarks of deception material; but the writer cannot think of a reason why the Germans would circulate material of this kind for deception purposes, especially since their concern about the Timor problem is undoubtedly very real.

11. However, if they were engaged in an elaborate plan of deception, they might well circulate such an item for the purpose of building up confidence in the source. It is of a type that is calculated to establish confidence, since it treats of a very private matter but one which nevertheless can be checked to a sufficient extent to establish probability.

e. (2) Is the report of a kind that might be issued as a piece of merchandise by one trying to make character as an informer?

12. Obviously it is of such a kind, since the subject is one of current interest, and the report is at least superficially plausible and has some support in fact.

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13. Two other comments may possibly help your people in their evaluation of the report:

a. The United States has not, so far as I know, made any use of the Timor situation as a lever with the Portuguese, and I would feel pretty sure that the Germans have no contrary impression.

b. If the message purports to state the reasons why the Germans are worried about further cooperation by Portugal with the Allies, it is to be noted that it omits the second important reason, viz., the possible loss of Portuguese Wolfram.

Conclusion:

14. The writer has not seen the report which is paraphrased in your memorandum; is unable to determine whether the subject report is probably authentic or probably spurious; inclines slightly to the latter view; but might feel differently if the actual text of the report, together with the name of the addressee, were available.

/s/ Alfred McCormack  
Colonel, General Staff

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March 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR J. R. Murphy  
 SUBJECT Boston Series

The second evaluation meeting on the Boston Series material was held at Colonel McCormack's office, Special Branch, M.I.D. The O.S.S. was represented by Mr. Frederick Meyer, SI, Lieutenant Bastedo of General Magruder's Office, and T. W. Dunn of X-2. The Special Branch was represented by Colonel McCormack and Henry Rigby.

Before the meeting the Special Branch representatives stated that they would discuss only Boston Series numbers 8, 9, 14, 22, 28, 30, 31, 23, 58, 62 and 88. This selection was made because these messages were the easiest for the Special Branch to evaluate. At the meeting, with the exception of messages 22, 28, and 58, it was stated that all the above enumerated messages were authentic. It was stated that messages 22, 28 and 58 could be authentic, but the Special Branch was not in a position to confirm this. The Special Branch representatives evinced the most interest in message number 30, which they stated could be known by only a small number of people.

Following this detailed dissemination we went over the first 75 messages in a general way. Colonel McCormack indicated which messages the Special Branch could evaluate and those which it could not. He made brief statements concerning those which could be evaluated. Notes are available concerning the Special Branch's opinion of individual messages on our X-2 copies. Of the first seventy-five messages, numbers 21, 27, 39, 40, 46, 52, 54, 55 and 72 are still being worked on in the Special Branch.

At the next meeting we will discuss these and the remainder of the messages received to date.

We have been waiting for your return to go over this material to decide how we should handle the dissemination of the information from this source that can be of value in our own shop. Lieutenant Bastedo, representing General Magruder, has told us that we are at liberty to use the material as we see fit within the Branch, providing, of course, the proper cover is used.

While there is not a great deal which is of counter-intelligence nature, you will find attached a list of the Boston messages from the first 75, which in the opinion of the writer contain information which may be of some use to X-2. None of this material could be evaluated by the Special Branch.

**TOP SECRET** Thomas W. Dunn

1. No. 16.
2. No. 18.
3. No. 51, lists 2 secret agents, -- 2 Abwehr, Tangiers, trying to get out.
4. No. 52, lists 1 Abwehr, Tangier -- Tetuan Exchange.
5. No. 56, only as slant on French relations.
6. No. 57, last two lines indicating new Genty.
7. No. 64 -- Alfonso Mabbe.
8. No. 70, cities with propaganda offices.
9. No. 71, certain French collaborationists.
10. No. 73, Fuetterer at Harbine.
11. No. 93, Serraut.
12. No. 94, names of certain university teachers working on propaganda, may be cover.
13. No. 95, name Walter used as signature.

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Mr. Richard Southgate

Thomas W. Dunn

Boston Series

April 6, 194

Mr. Murphy and the writer attended a meeting at the Special Branch, M.I.D., at which time the Boston Series messages, Nos. 76 through 134 were discussed.

Special Branch representatives stated that it was possible to authenticate only a relatively small number of messages in this group. Messages which they declared authentic are: 86, 88, 100 (probably authentic), 101 (probably authentic), 112 (probably authentic but facts incorrect), 124 (paragraph one authentic).

In a number of instances the content of the messages was declared probably true. A brief description of the Special Branch's opinion concerning these messages is as follows:

No. 76. No information available concerning authenticity of message or accuracy of content.

Nos. 77-84, inclusive. No information available concerning either the authenticity of the messages or their content.

No. 85. (Item dated November 15, 1943) It was stated that the Germans were circulating this story to a limited extent around Portugal in October 1943. In all probability it might have been a deception.

No. 87. The facts in this message are correct, although the last paragraph has been peddled everywhere throughout Europe.

No. 89. The information in this memorandum, it is stated, is logical and reasonable, although there is no confirmation of its authenticity.

No. 90. No information available concerning authenticity of message or accuracy of content.

No. 91. Reports indicate that the letter referred to in the second paragraph on page 4, under the date December 6, 1943, was written.

No. 92. No information available concerning the truth of this report or the authenticity of the message.

No. 93-98, inclusive. No information available concerning the truth of these reports or the authenticity of the messages.

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TO: Mr. Richard Southgate -2-

April 6, 1944

No. 102. The facts in this message are probably correct.No. 103. No information available concerning the truth of this report or the authenticity of the message.No. 104. It was stated that the facts in this message are plausible.No. 105. No information available concerning the truth of this report or the authenticity of the message.No. 106. It was stated that the facts in this message looked queer.No. 107. While there was no material to substantiate the message, the facts regarding the Field Marshal referred to have worked out as indicated.Nos. 108 - 111, inclusive. No information available concerning the truth of these reports or the authenticity of the messages.Nos. 113 - 117, inclusive. No information available concerning the truth of these reports or the authenticity of the messages.No. 118. Information concerning subject's relationship to the Abwehr, as well as his previous activities are correct.Nos. 119 - 122, inclusive. No information available concerning the truth of these reports or the authenticity of the messages.No. 123. This message puzzled the Special Branch representatives since the figures were the same as the story released generally by the Germans for propaganda purposes. The facts, however, are not correct.No. 124. Paragraph one is authentic. The material in paragraph two has not been possible to check, although it sounds o.k.No. 125. The facts as stated are probably correct.No. 126. The facts in this message are probably 100% accurate, but there is no evidence concerning the authenticity of the message. Special Branch representatives substituted the name Stahmer for Ott.No. 127. The facts as stated are substantially correct.No. 128. The facts as stated are correct and the message sounds authentic.No number. The message referring to Frau Von Grennu interested Special Branch representatives. It was stated that the report was made as in-**SECRET**

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TO: Mr. Richard Southgate -3-

April 6, 1944

dictated, but made prior to the 15th of February, and also indicated that she was going to leave. The message as received here states that she left on the 15th of February, 1944.

No. 129 - 131, inclusive. No information available concerning the truth of these reports or the authenticity of the messages.

No. 132. The facts as stated in this message sound correct, although the date in the third line which reads, "6 March 1944..." in the message, actually should be the 15th of March, 1944.

No. 133. This message is probably authentic.

No. 134. No information available concerning the truth of this report or the authenticity of the message.

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1 June 1944

Boston Series Number:	Evaluation
Special Report #14	No information on any of the numbered items. However, as regards item 5, that might be authentic since Spanish troops are believed to have been ordered to the French border as a preventive measure against disturbances of the kind mentioned.
Special Report #15	Paragraph 1, no information. However, certain German Foreign Office officials have been spending considerable time away from Berlin and the place names mentioned seem reasonable as places they may have frequented.
	As regards paragraph 2, those might well be the views of a "well placed German official."
#128-A	No information.
#135	No information.
#138	No information.
#144	No information.
#147	No information.
#148	Could be authentic as the facts are believed to be accurate.
#149	Believed to be authentic.
#150	Believed to be authentic.
#151	No information (126 believed to be authentic.)
#151-A	No information.
#151-C	Paragraph 1 believed to be authentic. Remaining paragraphs, no information.
#152	Believed to be authentic.
#153	All information believed to be authentic.
#154	Paragraph 1 - believed to be authentic. " 2 - " " " " 3 - no information. " 4 - " " 5 - " " 6 - " " 7 - believed to be authentic.

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**~~TOP SECRET~~**Boston Series Number:

#155 Could be authentic, although certain of the facts are somewhat in question.

#156 Could be authentic, because the facts are believed to be accurate.

#157 No information, but could be authentic because the facts are believed to be accurate.

#158 Could be authentic because the facts are believed to be accurate.

#159 Could be authentic.

#161 No information.

#162 No information.

#163 Paragraph 1 - no information.  
 " 2 - could be authentic.  
 " 3 - no information.  
 " 4 - the next to the last sentence may be authentic.  
 " 5 - sub-sections 1, 2 and 3 - No.information.  
 - sub-section 4 - most of the information could be authentic since the facts are approximately accurate.  
 - sub-section 5 - believed to be authentic.  
 - sub-section 6 - could be authentic since the facts are believed to be accurate.  
 " 6 - No information.  
 " 7 - No information.  
 " 8 - Could be authentic since the facts are approximately accurate.  
 " 9 - No information.  
 " 10 - No information.  
 " 11 - No information.  
 " 12 - Believed to be authentic.  
 " 13 - No information.  
 " 14 - Believed to be authentic.  
 " 15 - No information.  
 " 16 - No information.  
 " 17 - Could be authentic on the basis of very indirect evidence available.  
 " 18 - No information.  
 " 19 - Believed to be authentic since the facts are believed to be accurate.  
 20 - Could be authentic since the facts are believed to be approximately accurate.

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Boston Series Number:

Evaluation

#163 (Cont'd)	Paragraph 21 - (page 8) Believed to be authentic. " 22 - No information. " 23 - No information, except for the 3rd sentence which is believed to be authentic since the facts are be- lieved to be accurate. " 24 - Believed to be authentic since the facts are believed to be accurate.
#164	No information.
#RA-1, Para. 1 and "	Paragraph 1, no information. " 2, 1st sentence could be authentic since the facts are believed to be accurate. No information on the remainder of second -- paragraph.
#RA-1, Para. 2	No information.
#RA-1, " 3	Could be authentic as the facts are believed to be accurate.
#RA-1, Para. 9	No information.
#RA-1, " 10	No information.
#RA-2	Paragraph 1 - No information. " 2 - No information, but last sentence sounds plausible since Spain is reported to have made such a reply in another instance.
#RA-3	Paragraph 1 - No information. " 2 - Could be authentic as the facts are believed to be accurate.
#RA-4	Believed to be authentic.
#RA-5	No information.
#RA-1	No information, although Nitti is believed to have offered his services to the Italian government.
#RA-2	Paragraph 2 - Could be authentic since the facts are believed to be accurate.
#RA-3	Paragraph 3 - Could be authentic since the facts are believed to be accurate.
#RA-4	Paragraph 4 - First 2 sentences could be authentic as the facts are believed to be

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Boston Series Number:

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Evaluation

#163 (Cont'd)

Paragraph 21 - (page 8) Believed to be authentic.  
 " 22 - No information.  
 " 23 - No information, except for the  
       3rd sentence which is believed to be  
       authentic since the facts are be-  
       lieved to be accurate.  
 " 24 - Believed to be authentic since the  
       facts are believed to be accurate.

#164

No information.

#WA-1, Para. 1 and 7

Paragraph 1, no information.

" 2, 1st sentence could be authentic  
       since the facts are believed to  
       be accurate.

No information on the remainder of second --  
 paragraph.

#WA-1, Para. 2

No information.

#WA-1, " 3

Could be authentic as the facts are believed  
 to be accurate.

#WA-1, Para. 9

No information.

#WA-1, " 10

No information.

#WA-2

Paragraph 1 - No information.

" 2 - No information, but last sentence  
       sounds plausible since Spain is  
       reported to have made such a reply  
       in another instance.

#WA-3

Paragraph 1 - No information.

" 2 - Could be authentic as the facts  
       are believed to be accurate.

#WA-4

Believed to be authentic.

#WA-5

No information.

#WA-1

No information, although Nitti is believed  
 to have offered his services to the Italian  
 government.

#WA-2

Paragraph 2 - Could be authentic since the facts  
 are believed to be accurate.

#WA-3

Paragraph 3 - Could be authentic since the facts  
 are believed to be accurate.

#WA-4

Paragraph 4 - First 2 sentences could be authentic  
 as the facts are believed to be~~TOP SECRET~~

**TOP SECRET**Boston Series Number :Evaluation

#YA-4 (Cont'd)

accurate. No information on the remainder of YA-4, paragraph 4.

#YA-1

No information.

#YA-2

No information.

#YA-3

No information.

#ZA-1

Paragraph 1 - No information.

#ZA-3

Paragraph 5 - Could be authentic if "Padoglio" was intended to read "Mussolini" (HBF Error seems queer).

#ZA-4

Paragraph 8 and 9 - Could be authentic as the facts are believed to be accurate.

#ZA-5

Paragraph 7 - No information, although it is believed that the Fins were dissatisfied with the German treatment of the Daresin August and September.

#ZA-6

Paragraph 9 - No information.

#ZA-7

" 10 - Probably authentic.

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*TOP SECRET*Boston Series Item Reported on 22 August 1944

Reported expectations of Japanese naval authorities: An item in the Boston Series, supplied by the OSS, contains a paraphrase of what purports to be a 10 August report from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo. The report, which is considered to be probably authentic, attributes the following opinions to the "Japanese Admiralty".

a. Truk, Rabaul, Wake, western New Guinea and Bougainville, which have been by-passed by the Americans, have no value for general defense because they are situated in the outer defense zone. However, the Bonins, Yap and Palau are located in the inner zone. Landings on Yap and Palau are anticipated.

b. The next U.S. offensive will probably be launched against the Philippines rather than Okinawa (in the Nansei Islands, between Japan and Formosa), since the United States has concentrated 5 divisions in the New Guinea region and has landed troops (on 29 July) in western New Guinea and on Middleburg and Amsterdam Islands.

c. Air raids will probably be made on the Japanese mainland from the Marianas before the end of August.

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The paraphrase closes with the following statement:  
"A defeatist attitude is prevalent among the Japanese  
people, who are repeatedly expressing the opinion that  
Japan is following Germany's pattern."

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September 5, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR Mr. Charles S. Cheston

SUBJECT: Special Dissemination of Boston Series #384,  
#386 and #388.

Attached hereto is our memorandum of August 23, 1944 to Lt. Col. Sands describing in detail the special handling requested by General Donovan of messages #384, #386 and #388 in the Boston Series. (See same attachment for O.S.S. cable numbers.)

Also attached is a copy of the transmission of each of these three messages by M.I.S. to the individuals requested by the O.S.S. We have marked the Boston Series number in pencil on the M.I.S. dissemination.

You will remember that a complete description of the Boston Series was included in a dissemination by M.I.S. of May 6, 1944, a copy of which is in General Donovan's files. Colonel McCormack had several special representatives, trained in handling this type of material, spend the better part of a day checking all of their sources in order to evaluate and supplement it. Certain additions have been included on pages 1, 3, 5 and 6 of the material covering Boston Series #386 and #388.

In addition to sending Boston Series No. 384 to Admiral Nimitz, as requested, this was also sent to another list which included the White House. The actual copy sent to the White House, with red and black pencil markings made there, is attached, since it occurred to the M.I.S. representatives that this would be of interest to us. Since this copy must be returned to M.I.S. for their files, another copy is attached. Will you kindly return the M.I.S. copy to me when you have finished with it.

Major Roger Al Pfaff, Acting Chief  
By:

Thomas W. Dunn  
Lieutenant (j.g.) USNR

X-2 Branch

cc/ Lt. Col. Sands

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August 23, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR: Lt. Col. Oliver J. Sands

RE: Boston Series

Following General Magruder's request, I discussed with Col. McCormack the matter of the specific routing of these messages to the individuals indicated by General Donovan in his recent cables. In each instance, the messages will go directly and immediately through G-2 security channels to the individual. Full credit will be given to the O.S.S.

Listed below are the Number of the message and the date on which it was sent to the specific individual requested by General Donovan:

<u>Refer to In Number</u>	<u>Bern Number</u>	<u>Boston Series Number</u>	<u>Message to go to</u>	<u>Date Received by G-2</u>	<u>Date Sent By G-2</u>
17839	4551-54	384	Nimitz	8-21-44, 6 p.m.	8-22
17843	4537-42	388	Pres. Roosevelt Gen. Marshall Secretary Hull	8-22-44, 6 p.m.	8-23
17843	4573-79	386	Pres. Roosevelt Gen. Marshall Secretary Hull	8-22-44, 6 p.m.	8-23

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Thomas W. Dunn  
Lt. (j.g.) U.S.N.R.  
X-2 Branch

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d. "Until Germany can increase her strength in the air, she cannot launch a counterattack against the enemy in France."

2. Reported expectations of Japanese naval authorities: An item in the Boston Series, supplied by the OSS, contains a paraphrase of what purports to be a 10 August report from the German Military Attaché in Tokyo. The report, which is considered to be probably authentic, attributes the following opinions to the "Japanese Admiralty":

a. Truk, Rabaul, Wake, western New Guinea and Bougainville, which have been by-passed by the Americans, have no value for general defense because they are situated in the outer defense zone. However, the Bonins, Yap and Palau are located in the inner zone. Landings on Yap and Palau are anticipated.

b. The next U.S. offensive will probably be launched against the Philippines rather than Okinawa (in the Nansei Islands, between Japan and Formosa), since the United States has concentrated 5 divisions in the New Guinea region and has landed troops (on 29 July) in western

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New Guinea and on Middleburg and Amsterdam  
Island.

c. Air raids will probably be made on the  
Japanese mainland from the Mariamas before the  
end of August.

The paraphrase closes with the following  
statement:

"A defeatist attitude is prevalent among  
the Japanese people, who are repeatedly expressing  
the opinion that Japan is following Germany's  
pattern."

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German-Bulgarian relations: As previously noted, throughout July Germany gave the Bulgarians some assistance in their efforts to appease Russia; among other things, German troops and equipment were apparently withdrawn from Varna and other points in Bulgaria (DS 12 Aug 44). By 12 August, however, the Germans had told the Bulgarian Military Attaché in Berlin that they expected more military assistance, in the form of increased preparations for defense against Turkey and stronger efforts against the partisans. The status of German-Bulgarian relations at that time was not entirely clear, but the German demand included the statement that Marshal von Weichs had been given the task of insuring that the Bulgarians complied (DS 19 Aug 44).

The O.S.S. has now supplied a Boston Series item paraphrasing what purports to be a 14 August message from Adolf Beckerle, Germany's Minister to Bulgaria. The item, which is considered probably authentic, describes a meeting at Chamkoria\* between Beckerle and the three Bulgarian regents, Prince Cyril, Filoff and Mikhoff. Apparently Beckerle delivered a strong statement on behalf of the German Foreign Office, accusing the Bulgarian Government of preparing to desert Germany and of adopting too favorable an attitude toward Russia. Beckerle also seems to have complained about an incident in which the Bulgarians, at Russian instigation, halted German military transport at some un-

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\*Chamkoria is a mountain resort south of Sofia where a number of Bulgarian officials have taken refuge.

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specified point or points and ordered certain German troops to be interned and their officers sent on to Belgrade minus their luggage.

Upon receipt of the German representations, the Bulgarians are said to have shown concern and emotion; "tears came to Filoff's eyes, while Prince Kyril kept tapping his fingers on the table." The ensuing conversation, during which Filoff did most of the talking, is described as follows:

Filoff: The Germans have drawn erroneous conclusions and are not being fair. The foundation stone of Bulgaria's foreign policy is still her alliance and friendship with the Reich. The Bulgarian Government believes that the course most favorable to Germany is to avoid as long as possible making the Balkans a battlefield. Germany should therefore evaluate everything Bulgaria is doing from that standpoint and have faith in Bulgarian allegiance.

Since Bulgaria's future depends entirely on a German victory, all efforts must be directed toward assuring that victory. The only way to prepare the Bulgarian people for war would be to prove that the Bulgarian Government has done all it could to avoid an armed clash with Russia. The Bulgarian Government had expected Russia to sever relations, a step which would have clarified the situation and brought the entire population together.

It is unjust to accuse Bulgaria of depending on German friendship when Germany was making conquests, and drawing away now that Germany is experiencing setbacks. Bulgaria is merely doing all she can, with the assent of Germany, to

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prevent the creation of another battlefield.

There is no chance that Bulgaria will turn communist. A stiffer campaign than ever before is now being carried on against the partisans.\*

The unpleasant episode of halting military transport could have been avoided if the Germans had not sent those few troops through Bulgarian territory.

Beckerle: Germany has tried to carry out the wishes of her Ally. Over and over again, however, we have advised the Bulgarians that we disagree with their views about handling Russia, even though we did agree to withdraw our offensive forces from Varna. Propaganda favorable to Russia and unfavorable to Germany is steadily continuing in Bulgaria, and is stronger than the campaign against the Russians. If the Bulgarians wish to keep on with their policy of appeasing Russia, they will be allowed to do so only insofar as Germany approves.

The conduct of the Bulgarians in halting military transport was insufferable.

Filoff: The responsibility for that incident lies with the Foreign Minister (presumably the Bulgarian Foreign Minister). As to Bulgaria's attitude toward Russia, it must be

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\*An 11 August report from CG, USAFIME attributed to partisan sources information that a heavy engagement was in progress between partisans and the Bulgarian Army in the Karlovo and Stara Zagora areas in Bulgaria.

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remembered that Bulgaria must maintain a general attitude befitting her as a little nation and she should not talk above her station and irritate people. In any event, the Bulgarians are the allies of Germany and will stand or fall with her. The Germans should have no fears of a change in Bulgaria's policy.

Prince Cyril (with heat): I wish to protest vigorously against the implication that my Government has altered its policy. You are entirely incorrect in making such an accusation.

Beckerle: In that connection I wish to draw your attention to the fact that the Bulgarian Government has not made any declaration on foreign policy.

Filoff: The meeting of the Sobranje on 17 August will present the first opportunity for making such a declaration. Beckerle is said to have concluded his report by stating that in his opinion the regents, especially Filoff, were sincere in wanting to preserve the alliance with Germany; that Filoff apparently exerted a preponderant influence in the regency, but that all the regents were swayed by their fear of domestic difficulties.

Note: On 17 August Ambassador Oshima's "contact man" told him the following:

On his way back from Turkey Franz von Papen talked with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Draganoff, who stated that:  
 (a) so long as he retained his post, Bulgaria would never desert Germany and submit to the Allies, (b) he believed that Germany understood Bulgaria's strong desire to improve

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her relations with Russia and hence her desire to avoid having her territory used as a base, and (c) the rumor that Bulgaria was carrying on direct negotiations with the Allies looking toward the withdrawal of her troops from former Greek and Yugoslav territory was pure enemy propaganda.

Report on situation of Vichy Government:

Another Boston Series item from the O.S.S. sets forth the substance of a message purportedly sent to Berlin on 14 August by Ambassador Abetz in Paris; the report made the following points:

- a. Petain wishes to go to Paris and there convoke the National Assembly and await the arrival of the Allies\*.
- b. Laval, independently of Petain, is also trying to bring about a meeting of the National Assembly and has made contact with Herricot and other influential Parliamentarians to that end. In that way, Laval hopes to forestall a Gaullist or Communist coup d'etat. Although Laval expects to be imprisoned or assassinated, he believes it is his duty to France to remain in Paris.
- c. A third of the Vichy Government members have also decided to stay in Paris. Another third, including Deat, Darmand, de Brinon\*\* and Bonnard (Minister of National Education) want to go eastward if Paris is evacuated. The rest

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\* Under Secretary von Steengracht of the German Foreign Office told Ambassador Oshima approximately the same thing on 16 August (DS 19Aug 44).

\*\* Fernand de Brinon, former Ambassador to Germany and currently Secretary of State for Franco-German relations. According to a report from the Swiss Minister in Vichy, on 18 August he applied urgently for Swiss visas for himself and his wife.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
 Military Intelligence Service  
 Washington

7 September 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. (J.S.) THOMAS DUNN:

Subject: Evaluation of Boston Items.

1. The following is for your information and covers items in the Boston series not included in the memoranda to you of 26 Jan 44 and 2 May 44.

2. The following Boston items are believed to be authentic:

25(Special Report)	128D
33(Special Report)	136
31	219
62	222
75(last paragraph)	223 (in part)
85(in part)	224 (in part)
86	294 (first sentence)
88	370
102(paragraph 1 in part)	373 (in part)
112(in part)	375
124(paragraph 1)	385
126	388 (in part)
127(except in reference to Hitler)	404
128	

3. The following items are possibly authentic because available information suggests that they may be authentic or because the facts stated are believed to be accurate:

17 (Special Report)	52 (paragraph 1)
18 (Special Report)	56 (paragraph 1)
32 (Special Report)	57
37 (Special Report)	58
XY (Special Report)	63
28	67
29	69
30	82
42	91
45	92 (paragraph 1)
46	93 (paragraph 2)
50	99 (in part)

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100 (in part)	270 (in part)
103	283
104	284
108	291
109	316 (in part)
110	322 (in part)
128E	326
133	329
215 (in part)	331
216 (in part)	332 (in part)
217 (in part)	337
218 (in part)	353
223 (in part)	354
225 (in part)	376
226	377
234 (in part)	391
238 (in part)	402
242 (in part)	403
253 (in part)	405 (in part)
256 (in part)	406 (in part)

4. In addition to the Boston items listed above, certain others have been of value and have been used in connection with other available material. Those items are as follows:

21 (Special Report)	345
28 (Special Report)	349
XX (Special Report)	355
263	360
295	371
300	384
314	387
336	395
339	411
341	

5. We expect soon to be able to give you a further memorandum evaluating certain Boston items concerning the Balkan countries.

/s/ Henry W. Rigby  
Chief, Immediate Reports Branch  
MIS

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
Military Intelligence Service  
Washington

16 October 1944

MEMORANDUM:

Subject: Boston Series.

The following comments are submitted concerning the Boston items listed below:

- 416 - Could be authentic.
- 417 - Could be authentic.
- 418 - No recent information available. Some of the information in this item is public knowledge.
- 419 - It is not certain that the events described in paragraph 1 resulted from the attempted Coup d'Etat of 20 July 1944.  
Paragraph 2 possible authentic.  
Paragraphs 3 and 4, no comment.

Special Report No. 38 - No information.

/s/ H. J. HENEMAN  
Military Intelligence Service

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**TOP SECRET**Boston Series Item Reported on 27 October 1944

Japanese view of Axis military situation: According to an item in the "Boston Series"\*\* believed to be authentic, German Ambassador Stahmer and his Military Attaché, Genlt. Kretschmer, talked at length with a high official in the Japanese War Ministry on 29 September. The report, which appears to be Stahmer's, describes the official as "the head of the Political Division of the Japanese War Ministry and the former Chief of Headquarters,"\*\* and quotes him in part as follows (a complete summary of the report is annexed as TAB B):

- a. "We believe that the British will launch an attack in full strength against Burma before long, probably in November. The attack may well take the form of a landing by British forces upon the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with Rangoon, Bangkok and the Kra Isthmus as the ultimate goals, rather than a simultaneous attack by British, American and Chungking units from Allied-held positions in Burma."
- b. "Japanese prospects, especially in Burma, will become worse if Germany fails to hold the Anglo-Americans in Europe. The fact that the American 81st Division, which we believed to be in Europe, was discovered to be (in the Southwest Pacific) caused us great anxiety."

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\* Paraphrases of purported German diplomatic messages obtained by OSS.  
\*\* Available organization charts of the Japanese War Ministry do not include a "Political Division". The individual referred to may be General Sugiyama who is presently Minister of War and served as Chief of General Staff until February 1944. It is possible, but seems unlikely, that two individuals were involved.

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c. "The economic situation in Chungking China is understood to be growing more and more catastrophic. However, the current Japanese military successes in China are not expected to affect the political position of Chiang Kai-Shek."

d. "During the past three months the Japanese Army has believed in the possibility of a reconciliation between Germany and Russia, but it now considers such a move no longer possible."

Stahmer's report also contained his own observations to the effect that his informant (a) thought Russia's neutral attitude toward Japan might change if Germany should be defeated, and (b) was worried about a separate peace between Germany and the Anglo-Americans.

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Summary of Ambassador Stahmer's Report  
of His 29 September Conversation  
with an Official in the Japanese  
War Ministry

On 29 September Genlt. Kretschmar and I had a confidential conversation with the head of the Political Division of the Japanese War Ministry and the former Chief of Headquarters.

The remarks of the Japanese official included the following:

"Japan expects the main attack against Mindanao to come from (the direction of) Morotai and Halmahera with a simultaneous subsidiary attack from ----- (word missing). Japan's defensive battle for the Palau Islands and Morotai is admittedly hindered by Allied air superiority; Japan is prepared to lose Morotai but considers that she has been successful in increasing (the flow of) supplies to her forces in the Palau Islands.

(My informant appeared to regard the Philippine declaration of war against the United States and Great Britain as a legal justification for Japan's defense of

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the Philippines as well as a measure which afforded Japan an actual increase in strength).

"We believe that the British will launch an attack in full strength against Burma before long, probably in November. The attack may well take the form of a landing by British forces upon the Andaman and Nicobar Islands with Rangoon, Bangkok and the Kra Isthmus as the ultimate goals, rather than a simultaneous attack by British, American and Chungking units from Allied-held positions in Burma in the west, north and east.

"It is estimated five to seven divisions from Ceylon and Calcutta will be available for the first wave of British landings on the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The total number of British divisions which can be withdrawn from India should not be overestimated, since part of them appear to be tied up in India and part are believed to need more thorough training. There recently arrived in India 50,000 men, principally from New Zealand, to aid in training those troops.

"Japanese prospects, especially in Burma, will become worse if Germany fails to hold the

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Anglo-Americans in Europe. The fact that the American 81st Division, which we believed to be in Europe, was discovered to be on Morotai\* caused us great anxiety. It is believed that the Anglo-Americans will take into account the precarious situation in Indo-China and in Thailand and that they will count on the cooperation of Chungking in the offensive against Burma and, subsequently, in an anticipated attack on Canton.

(My informant appeared to believe that the Anglo-Americans would not be able to count on much collaboration from Chungking.)

\*Admittedly, Chungking still has ample manpower, but no reserve arms are available. Chungking has proposed to the United States that only direct delivery of arms should be considered, instead of deliveries through Russia and the Communist Border Area. However, aside from an efficient air system, the only available means

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\*Actually, the 81st Division landed on Angaur Island in the Palau Group on 17 September, as announced in U.S. press dispatches of the following day.

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for immediate delivery of weapons to Chungking are overland via Dibrugarh ----- (two missing place names, presumably points on the Ledo Road) Tengchung-Lameng-Tali-Kunming. Furthermore, the extension (presumably from Myitkyina to Tengchung) is not expected to be ready before April 1945. We Japanese believe that even if 10,000 trucks are used, only about 25,000 tons of supplies can be delivered monthly.\* In spite of the Japanese withdrawal in north Burma, the road from ----- (missing place name) via Bhamo and Lungling to Lameng, is still closed to the allies.

"It is believed that internal difficulties in Chungking China are great, particularly because of the blockade of the Communist Border Area, which is tying up more Chungking forces than are being used against Japan. We Japanese also feel that the United States and Russia have harmed the Chungking Government by striving

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\*It is not clear whether this estimate refers to the present situation, or to some future period.

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to outdo each other with regard to the Communist Border Area Government. The economic situation in Chungking China is understood to be growing more and more catastrophic. However, the current Japanese military successes in China are not expected to affect the political position of Chiang Kai-shek.

"During the past three months the Japanese Army has believed in the possibility of a reconciliation between Germany and Russia, but it now considers such a move no longer possible. Therefore, it seems that, for the time being, there is no advantage in exploiting the existing areas of friction between Russia and the Anglo-Americans. However, the efforts of the United States to enrich itself more and more at British expense are believed to offer a possible chance for driving a wedge between those two Allies.

(Several times during the discussion my informant revealed that he was anxious about the possibility of a separate peace between Germany and the Anglo-Americans. He did not appear to regard Russia

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as a threat to Japan at the present moment, but anticipated the possibility of a change in Russia's attitude if Germany should be defeated.)

"Japan is aware that Germany, in keeping with the seriousness of the situation, is summoning all her strength for self-preservation. Furthermore, I believe that the time for quick territorial gains by the Allies is past, except perhaps in the southern Balkan areas. The main task for both Germany and Japan is to break the enemy's mastery of the air and to hold out by successful defensive tactics until after the presidential election in the United States."

I received the impression that Japan is doing everything conceivable to enter the final battle as strong as possible, particularly by building up her air arm and shipping tonnage and by strengthening the will of the people to resist. The fact that Japanese industry is still intact was pointed out as one reason for confidence in Japan's victory.

We ultimately agreed that German, as well as Japanese, policy could only become effective after the

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achievement of clear defensive successes, which will make  
it evident that the will to resist and the productive  
capacity of both nations will be maintained.

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WAR DEPARTMENT  
Military Intelligence Service  
Washington

28 December 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR LT. DUNN:

Subject: Evaluation of Boston Series

1. Presented below is the latest MIS evaluation of the Boston Series.
2. A large part of the Boston Series material is in the "documentary" class. Of the five hundred odd items in that category received to date, more than 25% are shown by other information to be authentic or probably authentic, and most of the remainder may well be authentic. In no case has such an item been conclusively proved to be spurious. Accordingly, it is considered reasonable to assume that all "documentary" items in the Series are authentic, except for items containing important information of a kind which the Germans would be particularly anxious to convey to the Allies.
3. Some of the items in the Boston Series are not "documentary", but rather consist of information and opinions provided by the person who supplies the material. It has not been possible to evaluate many of the items in that category. In general, however, it is considered that the source is reasonably reliable where the subject discussed is one on which he can get first-hand information by his own observation, and that on other subjects the source is of uncertain reliability.
4. As to the usefulness of the Boston Series, certain of the items have been of considerable value either because they provided information not previously available or because they supplemented information already at hand. When items of that sort have been received, they have been disseminated--usually in conjunction with other available information on the subject--to the White House, to the highest authorities in the War, Navy and State Departments, and to certain of the theaters of operations. Among the items so disseminated are numbers 215-218, inclusive, numbers 373, 386, 388, 402, 419, 427, 433 and 464 and Special Report 28. A fairly large proportion of the Boston Series material has been of little or no value for immediate intelligence purposes, in some cases because the information it contained was of no importance or because better information was available from other sources, and in other cases because it arrived too late to be of current interest.

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
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5. Apart from its usefulness for immediate intelligence purposes, such part of the "documentary" material as is available in unparaphrased form has been of great interest to those engaged in technical work relating to the production of similar intelligence. For that reason, it would be greatly appreciated if all steps possible (consistent with security) were taken to speed up delivery of the "documentary" material in unparaphrased form.

/s/ Alfred McCormack  
Colonel, G.S.C  
Director of Intelligence, MIS

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